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FROM ADIZ TO SFRA: THE FAA'S COMPLIANCE WITH
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES TO CODIFY
WASHINGTON, D.C. FLIGHT RESTRICTIONS
MICHELE S. SHEETS*
I. INTRODUCTION
MAGINE THAT YOU are a pilot flying your privately owned
Cessna along the eastern seaboard of the United States on a
mid-afternoon pleasure flight. Or, imagine that you are flying
your Cessna for business, carrying goods from one place to the
next. You know you are approaching the Washington, D.C.
area, and you know that certain flight restrictions are in effect,
but you do not know exactly what you need to do to fly over
metropolitan D.C. Should you contact air traffic control?
Should you have filed a flight plan? What are the specific proce-
dures you must follow? Suddenly, the thought of all the restric-
tions, regulations, and paperwork seems just as threatening as
the thought of being intercepted, and possibly shot down, by the
F-16 that will surely be sent for you. Tired and annoyed by the
thought of complying with all sorts of procedures, you turn your
Cessna around and head home.
Now imagine that you are a federal employee charged with
guarding the lives of Americans by preventing and combating
terrorism and maintaining safety in the skies. While combating
terrorism is not the primary thrust of your job, maintaining air-
space safety is a significant function, and you take it very seri-
ously. People begin to scurry around you, and you catch word
that an aircraft has penetrated the restricted airspace in the na-
tion's capital. The aircraft is unidentified and has made no at-
tempt to contact air traffic control. A Blackhawk and two F-16s
have been sent to intercept the aircraft. Your heart plummets
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into your stomach as you wonder whether we are facing another
terrorist attack. You hope that the aircraft is only another pilot
who did not comply with flight restrictions in the D.C. area.
Flight restrictions around Washington, D.C. sprouted up in
the aftermath of September 11 and after the United States sent
troops to the Middle East. In August 2005, the Federal Aviation
Administration ("FAA") sought to codify the major flight restric-
tions over Washington, D.C. by issuing the Washington, DC Met-
ropolitan Area Special Flight Rules Area ("DC SFRA") Notice of
Proposed Rule Making ("NPRM").' The influential Aircraft
Owners and Pilots Association ("AOPA") responded to the
NPRM, claiming the FAA did not meet the applicable legal stan-
dards in issuing the NPRM. But as will be shown, the NPRM is
not arbitrary and capricious, meets the regulatory flexibility re-
quirements, provides proper alternatives, and contains an ade-
quate cost-benefit analysis.
This comment will first briefly examine security measures cur-
rently in place in the Washington, D.C. area and the logistics of
the proposed DC SFRA. Second, the proposed rule will be ex-
amined in light of the "arbitrary and capricious" standard set
forth in the Administrative Procedure Act. Third, the regula-
tory flexibility analysis will be examined against the backdrop of
recent amendments to the Regulator Flexibility Act. Fourth, the
alternatives provided by the FAA will be examined against sug-
gestions from the AOPA. Fifth, the cost-benefit analysis of the
proposed rule required under Executive Order 12,866 will be
scrutinized. Finally, the conclusion will reiterate that the pro-
posed rule meets the applicable legal standards.
II. WASHINGTON, D.C. FLIGHT RESTRICTIONS
Immediately following September 11, 2001, the FAA halted
air traffic in the United States National Airspace System
("NAS"), with the exception of law enforcement, emergency,
and military aircraft. 2 Even as the flight restrictions were gradu-
ally lifted, the FAA retained the authority to issue flight restric-
I Washington, DC Metropolitan Area Special Flight Rules Area, 70 Fed. Reg.
45,250 (proposed Aug. 4, 2005) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 93) [hereinafter
DC SFRA NPRM].
2 Id. at 45,251.
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tions tinder Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations." Such
flight restrictions are issued as Notices to Airmen ("NOTAMs").'
A. SPECIAL. FEDERAL, AVIATION REGULATION 94
Until February 2005, three flight restrictions guarded the
Washington, D.C. area. The first, Special Federal Aviation Regu-
lation 94 ("SFAR 94"), required FAA approval of the safety pro-
cedures followed by the Maryland Three airports (College Park
Airport, Potomac Airfield, and Washington Executive/Hyde
Field), and required aircraft operators to comply with all proce-
dures and meet certain background criteria.5 The safety proce-
dures demanded of these airports included requiring the flight
crew to present a current airman certificate, a current medical
certificate, a government issued form of identification, and a
description of each aircraft the operator intended to operate to
or from the airport, including the make, model, and registration
number." SFAR 94 also required flight crews to pass a back-
ground check, attend a briefing session regarding airport secur-
ity procedures, have no more than one violation of an air
restriction, be authorized to fly to and from the airport, and fly
an authorized aircraft.7 Pilots were required to file a flight plan
to operate in the D.C. area, stay in radio contact with air traffic
control ("ATC"), fly an aircraft with an operable transponder
and use a discrete transponder code, follow the instructions of
ATC while in flight, secure the aircraft upon arrival, and comply
with additional information.' While SFAR 94 expired on Febru-
ary 13, 2005, the Transportation Security Administration
' Id.
FED. AVIATION ADMIN., AFRONAU'FICAL INFORNIAT IONAL MANUAL § 3-5-3(a)
(2004). NOTAMs can be found on the FAA website, http://wwv.faa.gov.
5 14 C.F.R. pt. 91, SFAR No. 94 (2005).
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 1(d. A discrete transponder code is issued to an aircraft by ATC before take-
off. Discrete transponder codes are required to fly "instrument flight rules"
("IFR"). IFR is required in certain weather conditions and in specified airspace,
such as the DC Air Defense Identification Zone. The opposite of IFR is "visual
flight rules" ("VFR"). Neither a discrete transponder code nor a flight plan is
needed to fly NrFR, but the weather must meet certain conditions to allow for VFR
flight. Telephone Interview with Sean C. Boynton, Captain, United States Marine
Corps, USMC CH-46E helicopter pilot, in Beaufort, S.C. (Jan. 23, 2006) [herein-
after Boynton interview].
2006] 617
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
("TSA") promulgated the same airport security measures, which
are currently in effect.9
B. WASHINGTON, DC METROPOLITAN AREA FLIGHT
RESTRICTED ZONE
The second flight restriction is the Washington, DC Metropol-
itan Area Flight Restricted Zone ("DC FRZ"). The DC FRZ ex-
tends to a fifteen-nautical mile radius around the heart of
Washington, D.C. and restricts air traffic, except for operations
of people required to carry a certificate to fly in the area under
FAA regulations.'0 The implementation of the DC FRZ resulted
in the loss of the north-south route from Reagan National to
Dulles International Airports and narrowed the passageway ex-
tending east-west from Regan National to Baltimore/Washing-
ton Airports. "
C. WASHINGTON, DC AIR DEFENSE IDENTIFICATION ZONE
The third flight restriction in the Washington, D.C. area is the
Air Defense Identification Zone ("DC ADIZ"). Issued in Febru-
ary 2003, the DC ADIZ encompasses the DC FRZ and extends
outward from the FRZ core. Both the DC FRZ and the DC ADIZ
were designed to protect the D.C. area from airborne terrorist
attacks after consideration of factors such as "the speed of likely
suspect aircraft, minimum launch time and the speed of inter-
cept aircraft."'12 The area included in the DC ADIZ follows the
Washington Tri-area Class B airspace.13 The DC ADIZ "cover [s]
9 DC SFRA NPRM, supra note 1, at 45,251. See also Maryland Three Airports:
Enhanced Security Procedures for Operations at Certain Airports in the Wash-
ington, DC Metropolitan Area Flight Restricted Zone, 49 C.F.R. pt. 1562 (2005).
10 DC SFRA NPRM, supra note 1, at 42,252.
11 Michael W. Brown, TFR Airspace Obstacles and TFR Trivia, A Pilot's Guide to
Understanding Restrictions in Today's National Airspace System, FAA AvATION NEWS,
Nov./Dec. 2003, at 4.
12 Id.
13 Id. The NAS is divided into classes, and each class has different require-
ments that pilots must fulfill to fly in the airspace. Class G airspace, for example,
is uncontrolled airspace and often does not require pilots to file a flight plan with
ATC. Class B Airspace is found around the busiest airports in the country. To fly
in Class B airspace, the operator must file a flight plan with ATC and stay in radio
communication with ATC. Class B Airspace stretches from the surface of the
earth to 10,000 feet mean sea level ("MSL"). The radius of the airspace varies,
often with the largest radius at the highest altitude, and becoming increasingly
narrow toward the earth's surface. It has been described as an "upside-down wed-
ding cake." FED. AVIATION ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., U.S. AIRSPACE CLASSES
(AIRSPACE AT A GLANCE CARD), available at http://www.asy.faa.gov/safety-prod-
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all the airspace from the ground up to 18,000 feet that falls
within [30] miles of Washington Reagan (DCA), within [30]
miles of Washington Dulles (LAD), and within [30] miles of Bal-
timore Washington (BWI) airport."' 4
Pilots are subject to numerous requirements when flying iin
the DC ADIZ. First, the aircraft must have an operable two-way
radio with which the pilot can stay in contact with ATC for the
duration of his flight in the DC ADIZ.1'5 The aircraft must have
"an operating transponder with automatic altitude reporting ca-
pability as specified in 14 CFR § 91.215."" Third, pilots in-
tending to fly into the DC ADIZ must file a flight plan with ATC,
must activate that flight plan before flying into the DC ADIZ,
and must close the flight plan after departing from the DC
ADIZ,' 7 Fourth, the aircraft must obtain a discrete transponder
code.' 8 Fifth, the aircraft must receive clearance from ATC to
fly into the Class B, C, or D airspace that is within the DC
ADIZ.I" Sixth, the flight crew must maintain two-way radio coin-
munications with ATC the entire time they are flying within the
DC ADIZ.211
The Department of Homeland Security ("DHS"), the Depart-
ment of Defense ("DOD"), and the FAA have worked together
to implement this plan in an effort to guard the airspace in the
United States against further terrorist attacks.2' Air defense
identification zones have been used previously as a defense mea-
ucts/airspaceclass.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2006) [hereinafter Airspace at a
Glance].
"I Comment from Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association to Ellen Cru1m, U.S.
Dep't of Transp. (Nov. 2, 2005) [hereinafter AOPA Comment]. The AOPA is a
not-for-profit organization that has advocated the interests of general aviation
pilots and aircraft owners since 1939. History of AOPA, http://wv.aopa.org/
info/history.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2006).
15 NOTAM 3/2126 pt. 3 (issued Mar. 18, 2003).
16 Id.
17 Id. at pt. 4.
18 Id.
1 Id. at pt. 3. Normally when flying in Class C or Class D airspace, instead of
receiving ATC clearance, the pilot only needs to contact ATC before penetrating
the airspace and remain in contact while in the airspace. Class C airspace is
found surrounding airports with an operational control tower, that are serviced
by radar approach control, and that support a specified number of IFR opera-
tions or passenger enplanements. Class D airspace is found arotund airports with
an operation control tower. Class E airspace is controlled airspace that is not
Class A, Class B, Class C, or Class D. There are generally no entry requiIrements
to penetrate Class E airspace. Airspace at a Glance, supra note 13.
20 NOTAM 3/2126 pt. 3.
2 DC SFRA NPRM, supra note 1, at 45,252.
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sure, for example, during the Cold War as a defense against the
Soviet Union. 22 If an unknown aircraft came into an identifica-
tion zone and could not be identified by radio interrogation, a
military aircraft would intercept the unknown aircraft in an ef-
fort to identify it.23 Today, ADIZs guard other areas of airspace
in the country, in addition to Washington, D.C., such as the
coastal borders of the United States, Alaska, Hawaii, and
Guam.24
The FAA and other federal agencies take violations of flight
restrictions very seriously. The success of any flight restriction in
the D.C. area depends upon the cooperation of numerous fed-
eral agencies. When an emergency situation arises, government
action is collectively taken by the National Capital Region Coor-
dination Center ("NCRCC"), which includes the FAA, the Secret
Service, the Capitol Police, the Customs and Border Protection,
the DOD, and the TSA.25 For example, on May 11, 2005, a sin-
gle-engine Cessna entered the DC ADIZ about forty miles north
of DCA.26 The aircraft was not squawking a discrete transpon-
der code, the pilot had not contacted ATC, and no one had
filed a flight plan for the aircraft. 27 The plane was not consid-
ered a security threat until it turned southward, heading directly
for the DC FRZ. 28 The FAA contacted the Potomac Consoli-
dated Terminal Radar Approach Control ("TRACON") ATC fa-
cility, which confirmed the aircraft was not in compliance with
DC ADIZ procedure. 29 The Customs and Border Protection Of-
fice of Marine Operations ("AMO") acted first, launching a
Black Hawk helicopter and Citation jet.3 ° Two F-16s were also
sent after the aircraft.3' The Black Hawk intercepted the air-
craft first but could not communicate with it, leading the DOD
to order the F-16s to use flares to alert the pilot.3 2 The aircraft
22 AOPA Comment, supra note 14, at 5.
23 Id. at 5-6.
24 Brown, supra note 11, at 4.
25 General Aviation Security for the Capitol Area: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Com-
merce, Science & Transp., 109th Cong. 2 (2005) (statement of Jonathan Fleming,
Chief Operating Officer of the TSA) [hereinafter Senate Hearing].
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 3.
29 Id. at 4 (statement of Michael Cirillo, Vice President for System Operation of





FROM ADIZ TO SFRA
finally made contact with the AMO Citation jet, and the pilots
were instructed to follow the Black Hawk and the F-16s to Fred-
erick, Maryland for landing."3 Ultimately, one of the pilots lost
his FAA license as a result of his "inability to navigate ade-
quately, his lack of knowledge of how to respond to an inter-
cept, [and] his failure to communicate with air traffic control
"3B4
D. REQUIREMENTS OF THE PROPOSED WASHINGTON, DC
METROPOLITAN AREA SPECIAL FLIGHT RULES AREA
In August 2005, the FAA proposed to codify the expired SFAR
94 and the current DC ADIZ and DC FRZ via the DC SFRA,
making these restrictions permanent fixtures in the national air-
space system. 5 In its summary, the FAA stated the following:
The FAA purposes to codify current flight restrictions for certain
aircraft operations in the Washington, DC Metropolitan Area.
This action is necessary because of the ongoing threat of terrorist
attacks. The FAA intends by this action to help the Department
of Homeland Security and the Department of Defense protect
national assets in the National Capital region.m
While operating in the DC SFRA, aircraft would be subject to
the same requirements now in place for the DC ADIZ, listed
above. 7 The FAA would also retain the more rigid flight restric-
tions in the current DC FRZ.38 Part 121 aircraft," ' DOD law en-
forcement aircraft, and aeromedical aircraft could continue to
operate in the DC FRZ but would have to remain in continuous
contact with ATC. 40 The former SFAR 94 would be incorpo-
rated by requiring flight communication for aircraft operating
from the Maryland Three airports, including the requirements
of filing a flight plan, maintaining two-way radio communica-
tions, and abiding by transponder procedures.4 1 Special proce-
dures would be implemented for two area airports-Bay Bridge
and Kentmorr-that would allow pilots to bypass the flight plan
B Id1.
:1" Id. at 5.
35 DC SFRA NPRM, supra note 1, at 45,251.
'6 Id. at 45,252.
:17 Id. at 45,253.
s Id. at 45,252.
: "Part 121" are those pilots and employees carrying a certification to fly in the
DC FRZ, and are defined in 14 C.F.R. § 121.
4o DC SFRA NPRM, supra note 1, at 45,252.
1' Id. at 45,254.
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requirement when flying into or out of either airport, as long as
the aircraft maintained a certain altitude, followed a certain
route, and displayed a certain ATC-assigned transponder code.42
Pilots departing from fringe airports (those that are near the
outer boundary of the DC SFRA) would not have to file a flight
plan or maintain two-way radio contact with ATC if they dis-
played transponder code 1205 and exited the SFRA by the most
direct route.4 3 Finally, the proposal also seeks to designate the
airspace over the D.C. metropolitan area as "National Defense
Airspace."44
Consequences for those who fail to adhere to the DC SFRA
procedures would include criminal penalties such as a fine or
imprisonment for willfully violating the DC SFRA procedures.4 5
The FAA could also take administrative action against pilots who
violate the DC SFRA by revoking their pilot certificate and/or
imposing civil penalties.46 Additionally, unidentified aircraft
could be subject to direct deadly force if the aircraft is seen as an
"imminent security threat. 4
7
E. AOPA OPPOSITION TO THE DC SFRA
The AOPA filed a response to the DC SFRA NPRM in early
November 2005, listing numerous objections to making the DC
SFRA permanent.48 First, the AOPA implied that the DC SFRA,
if implemented, would be arbitrary and capricious under the
Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"). 49 Second, the AOPA
questioned the extent of the regulatory flexibility analysis con-
ducted by the FAA.50 Third, the AOPA criticized the alternatives
to the DC SFRA proposed, and ultimately rejected, by the FAA.5'
Finally, the AOPA alleged the FAA's cost-benefit analysis con-
ducted under Executive Order 12,866 did not consider all rele-
vant factors.52
42 Id. The transponder code for Bay Bridge Airport would be 1227, and the
transponder code for Kentmorr Airport would be 1233. Id.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 45,253.
45 Id.; see also 49 U.S.C.A. § 46307 (West 2005).
M3 DC SFRA NPRM, supra note 1, at 45,253.
47 Id.
41 AOPA Comment, supra note 14.
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III. IS THE DC SFRA "ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS"
UNDER THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT?
When Congress passes a law, the administrative agency
charged with implementing the rule will often promulgate rules
and regulations for the public to follow in order to realize Con-
gress's wishes. Such rulemaking is governed by the APAY5 Gen-
erally, agencies are required to publish an NPRM in the Federal
Register and should provide "(1) a statement of the time, place,
and nature of public rule making proceedings; (2) reference to
the legal authority under which the rule is proposed; and (3)
either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a descrip-
tion of the subjects and issues involved. 54
A. THE ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS STANDARD
If challenged, a court will review an agency rule tinder the
"arbitrary and capricious" standard.55 This test depends on fac-
tors such as the magnitude of the agency's rule and the credibil-
ity of the agency's decision.) It is necessary, however, for
agencies to demonstrate to the court that their decision was a
logical conclusion based on credible information, including an
examination of alternative means of regulation.57 "An agency
must satisfy the court that it has considered all pertinent dimen-
sions of the matter before it and must explain its resolution of
contested questions in a reasoned way. '' 58
The AOPA compared the DC SFRA to Motor Vehicle Manufac-
turers Ass'n of the United States v. State Farm Mutual Automobile In-
surance Co. to illustrate the arbitrary and capricious standard.
There, Congress enacted the National Traffic and Motor Vehi-
cle Safety Act of 1966, which required the Secretary of Transpor-
tation to promulgate motor safety standards in an effort to
reduce the number of accidents and deaths from highway traffic
53 See generally Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 551 (West 2005).
54 Id. § 553(b)(1)-(3). The comment period originally closed on November 2,
2005, but the FAA extended the deadline until February 6, 2006. Washington,
DC Special Flight Rules Area; Reopening of Comment Period and Intent to Hold
Public Meeting, 70 Fed. Reg. 67,388 (proposed Nov. 7, 2005) (to be codified at
14 C.F.R. pt. 93).
55 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A).
53 M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of tolicymaking Form, 71 U. Ciii. L. RFr.
1383, 1414 (2004).
57 Id. at 1415.
58 Id. at 1428.
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accidents.59 The Department of Transportation ("DOT") origi-
nally issued an order requiring the installation of seatbelts in all
vehicles in 1967, but through the years the rule underwent nu-
merous modifications until 1981, when the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration ("NHTSA") rescinded the safety
standard requiring passive restraint systems (seatbelts that must
be engaged by the passenger or driver and airbags) to be put in
automobiles. 60 The NHTSA maintained that the safety benefits
found in the 1960s that had prompted a restraint safety standard
were no longer evident.6 Since automobile manufacturers
planned to use automatic seatbelts in ninety-nine percent of
new automobiles, leaving only one percent of automobiles with
airbags, the benefits of airbags would remain untapped.6 2 The
unrealized benefits of airbags, in conjunction with the finding
that the belts that manufacturers planned to use could be de-
tached and remain so while driving, led the NHTSA to deter-
mine that there was no longer a reliable basis demonstrating the
safety impact of passive restraints.6 Also, NHTSA estimated that
a mandatory automatic restraint system would cost the automo-
bile industry $1 billion and was unsure about the sufficiency of
the system, leading to a potential public perception of the regu-
lation as wasteful.64
59 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 33 (1983).
6o Id. at 34-38. Soon after the initial requirement that seatbelts be installed in
all vehicles (promulgated under Standard 208), the DOT realized that motorists
were not wearing seatbelts, so traffic injury rates had not decreased. Id. at 34. In
1969, the DOT proposed a requirement of passive restraints (automatic seatbelts
or airbags), and by 1972 the DOT required passive restraints for drivers and front
seat passengers in all vehicles manufactured after August 15, 1975. Id. at 35. For
vehicles manufactured from August 1973 until the new standard came into effect
in August 1975, manufacturers had the option of using automatic belts and
airbags, or of using a lap and shoulder belt with an "ignition interlock," which
prevented the car from starting until the seatbelts were engaged. Id. Many car
manufactures chose the ignition interlock, but public outcry led Congress to
amend the enabling legislation to preclude ignition interlock or continual buzz-
ing as a means to satisfy safety standards. Id. at 36. Leadership turnover in the
DOT eventually led to Modified Standard 208, under which passive restraints sys-
tems (either airbags or automatic belts) would be phased into all cars beginning
in 1982. Id. at 37. Even though success was reported from those vehicles that
implemented passive restraints, in 1981 Modified Standard 208 was delayed a
year due to economic hardships in the automobile manufacturing industry. Id. at
38. Finally Modified Standard 208 was completely rescinded. Id.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 38-39.
64 Id. at 39.
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The Court found rescission of the passive restraint system to
be arbitrary and capricious because NHTSA did not consider
mandatory airbags in automobiles in response to the industry's
intent to install detachable seatbelts.65 The Court determined
that questions about the benefits of detachable belts did not de-
tract from the lifesaving capabilities of airbags." ' In addition,
the Court noted that the enabling act aimed to reduce traffic
injuries and fatalities, and although seatbelts could not achieve
such a result, the NHTSA had no basis for failing to require the
installation of airbags.67 Further, industry resistance to airbags
did not justify a decision by NHTSA to rescind the safety stan-
dard that allowed for airbag installation as a means of achieving
fewer traffic injuries and fatalities."8 In short, because early find-
ings indicated airbags could effectively reduce traffic injuries
and fatalities, dismissing the option of airbag installation to
meet safety concerns by rescinding Modified Standard 208 in its
entirety was not a reasoned judgment on the part of NHTSA.""
The Court also considered the other ramification of re-
scinding Modified Standard 208-no longer requiring auto-
matic seatbelts in new automobiles. Because automobile
manufacturers planned to install detachable seatbelts, NHTSA
could not foresee even a five percent increase in the use of
seatbelts' The Court noted that "[re] scission of the passive re-
straint requirement would not be arbitrary and capricious sim-
ply because there was no evidence in direct support of the
agency's conclusion."7  But in this case, the Court found
NHTSA's evidence to be insufficient. First, the safety benefits
resulting from seatbelt usage were unquestionable.72 Second,
NHTSA produced no evidence showing that detachable
seatbelts would not be used by motorists despite findings in the
record revealing twice as many drivers used detachable auto-
matic seatbelts as used manual seatbelts.7" While the NHTSA
believed the users were atypical and that ignition interlocks
65 Id. at 46.
- Id. at 47.
'7 Id. at 48.
-8 Id. at 49.
69 Id. at 51.
71 Id. The circuit court, however, concluded that the evidence did not ade-
quately demonstrate that potential increased seatbelt usage would not justify the
cost of Modified Standard 208. Id.
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(buzzing sounds or locking of the engine until the seatbelt is
engaged) skewed the results, the claimants believed the data
demonstrated the effectiveness of the safety standard.74 The
Court recognized that agencies often employ their own judg-
ment in promulgating rules and regulations, but it reiterated
that agencies must still justify those decisions and their relation
to the facts in the record.75 NHTSA failed to justify its decision
because it did not take into account the difference between cur-
rent manual belts, which required action to be effective, and de-
tachable automatic belts, which when reattached, functioned
without further action by the passenger or driver. 76 Such a dif-
ference could have led to more frequent use of the detachable
automatic belts.77 Findings by NHTSA also showed, despite its
predictions, that occasional users would realize the benefits of
the automatic seatbelts to a greater extent because once at-
tached, the seatbelts would function. 7  The Court also dis-
missed NHTSA's argument that the public would resent the
increased costs of automobiles because of the required restraint
system, after reviewing Congressional intent of the enabling act
and finding safety to be the first goal instead of manufacturer
preference or public outcry.79
Finally, the Court found the rescission to be arbitrary and ca-
pricious because NHTSA did not consider, or give reasons for
not considering, a non-detachable seatbelt (one that would
spool out so the user could exit the vehicle easily).80 NHTSA
determined that users feared that non-detachable seatbelts
would preclude escape in the case of an emergency, but did not
explain how emergency release mechanisms would fail to ac-
commodate emergency release situations."1 All of these reasons
led the Court to conclude that rescission of Modified Standard
208 was arbitrary and capricious.
74 Id. at 53.
75 Id. at 52.
76 Id. at 54.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 55.
80 Id. at 56.
81 Id.
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B. FAA's ANALYSIS UNDER THE ARBITRARY AND
CAPRICIOUS STANDARD
As discussed in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers, a court will ex-
amine the congressional intent of the enabling statute and will
also determine if the agency's decision is supported by sufficient
evidence.
The enabling statute for implementation of the DC SFRA, in
pertinent part, provides the following:
To establish security provisions that will encourage and allow
maximum use of the navigable airspace by civil aircraft consistent
with national security, the Administrator [of the FAA], in consul-
tation with the Secretary of Defense, shall (A) establish areas in
the airspace the Administrator decides are necessary in the inter-
est of national defense; and (B) by regulation or order, restrict
or prohibit flight of civil aircraft that the Administrator cannot
identify, locate, and control with available facilities in those
areas.82
1. Factors that Congress Intended for the FAA to Use
In order to determine Congressional intent, the plain lan-
guage of the provision should be considered. The enabling stat-
ute clearly charges the FAA with establishing airspace
restrictions and with ensuring identification. Also, the FAA is
ordered to consult with the Secretary of Defense to establish air-
space restrictions. The Secretary of Defense, as head of the
DOD, acts in accordance with the National Security Act of 1974
(amended in 1949).s The National Security Act of 1947 begins
by stating "[I] t is the intent of Congress to provide a compre-
hensive program for the future security of the United States
.... "84 Also, the Secretary of Defense sits on the National Secur-
ity Council, undertakes military strength assessments, advises the
President on military and national security matters, and "coordi-
nate [s] the policies and functions of the departments and agen-
cies of the Government relating to the national security....
Based on the functions of the Secretary of Defense and the
DOD, it is not rational to interpret the function of the FAA act-
ing in conjunction with the DOD as anything but protecting the
country by monitoring the NAS. As a result, it is not implausible
82 49 U.S.C.A. § 40103(b)(3)(A)-(B) (West 2005).
"1 10 U.S.C.A. § 113(a)-(b) (West 2005).
s4 National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C.A. § 401 (West 2005).
85 Id. § 402(b).
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to assume that Congress would expect the FAA to consider fac-
tors relating to potential terrorist threats when promulgating a
rule under the authority of 49 U.S.C. § 40103.
In addition, support for the FAA's proposed rule can be
found in the agency's history. The FAA was born of the con-
glomeration of two predecessor agencies with the responsibili-
ties of safety rulemaking and of overseeing ATC."6 Today the
FAA is charged with many missions, such as supervising opera-
tion and maintenance of aircraft, certifying airmen, overseeing
the use of airspace, and providing for the "security control of air
traffic to meet national defense requirements. '87 In addition,
the FAA possesses statutory authority to "develop plans and pol-
icy for the use of the navigable airspace and assign by regulation
or order the use of the airspace necessary to ensure the safety of
aircraft and the efficient use of airspace. ' 8 Further, the FAA
can "establish security provisions that will encourage and allow
maximum use of the navigable airspace by civil aircraft consis-
tent with national security."8' 9
To accomplish the goals set forth above, the FAA, like any
other governmental agency, publishes rules in the Federal Reg-
ister. The FAA also issues information in other ways to the avia-
tion community. One such way is called a temporary flight
restriction ("TFR"). 9° TFRs are governed by Title 14 of the
Code of Federal Regulations, §§ 91 and 99.91 TFRs are issued to
pilots in the form of NOTAMs. 92 Pilots must stay current with
all NOTAMs to avoid the loss of their pilot's certificate or inter-
ception by government aircraft.9 3 The FAA increased its use of
TFRs in recent years because of an amendment to the Code of
Federal Regulations allowing flight restrictions over major sport-
ing events such as air shows and because of constant security
86 FED. AVIATION ADMIN., A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINIS-
TRATION, http://www.faa.gov/about/history/brief history/ (last visited Sept. 10,
2006).
87 U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., DOT ORGANIZATIONS, http://www.dot.gov/summary.
htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2006).
88 49 U.S.C.A. § 40103(b)(1) (West 2005).
89 Id. § 40103(b) (3); see also DC SFRA NPRM, supra note 1, at 45,250.
90 Brown, supra note 11, at 1.
91 Id. at 3. See, e.g., id. § 91.141 (2005) (protection of the President and other
public figures); id. § 91.145 (restrictions during aerial and sporting events).
92 See 14 C.F.R. § 91.137(a) ("The Administrator will issue a Notice to Airmen
(NOTAM) designating an area within which temporary flight restrictions apply
and specifying the hazard or condition requiring their imposition.
93 Brown, supra note 11, at 1.
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threats.' In particular, 14 C.F.R. § 99.7 allows for TFR issuance
specifically for occasions calling for concern over national secur-
ity. 1 5 Section 99.7 TFRs allow for flight restrictions over military
bases throughout the nation, around large cities, over major
sporting events, and over sites such as nuclear power plants and
refineries."-
The day to day operations of the FAA include constant aware-
ness and concern regarding national security. Because of the
FAA's continual involvement in national security, and because
the FAA is charged with controlling the NAS, the DC SFRA is
likely in accord with the factors Congress considered when pass-
ing the enabling act underlying the FAA's action.
2. Connecting Facts in the DC SFRA to the FAA's Decision
In addition to using factors that Congress intended, an agency
must also make a reasoned decision guided by the facts.97 The
court, however, must comply with the deferential standard."8
For example, in Ranchers Cattleman Legal Fund United Stockgrowers
of America v. United States Department of Agriculture, the United
States Department of Agriculture ("USDA") calculated the prev-
alence rate of cattle from Canada with mad cow disease upon
credible data, but the district court favored the calculation of
the Ranchers Cattleman Legal Fund, the organization challeng-
ing the final rule. '9 The Ninth Circuit, however, disagreed with
the trial court because the information used by the USDA was
credible and therefore the USDA could have reasonably relied
on it.' Furthermore, the Supreme Court has instructed lower
courts to defer to agency decisions that are of "'less than ideal
clarity' if 'the agency's path may reasonably be discerned.' ' ' 10
For example, the Ninth Circuit deferred to the USDA's finding
that the risk to Americans and to U.S. cattle of contracting mad
cow disease from importing cattle from Canada (where two inci-
94 Id. at 1-2.
'5 Id. at 3.
- Id, See also 17 C.F.R. § 99.7.
97 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n oJ the United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 463 U.S. 29, 33 (1983).
98 See Ranchers Cattleman Action Legal Fund United Stockgrowers of Am. v.
U.S. Dep't of Agric., 415 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 2005).
9,9 Id. at 1093-94.
loo Id. at 1094.
101 Id. at 1097 (quoting Alaska Dep't of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S.
461, 495 (2004)).
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dents of the disease had been reported) was "very low."' 1 2 While
the district court wanted hard numbers, the circuit court found
adequate evidence in the record to support the USDA's conclu-
sions. ' The circuit court also stated that rule should be ana-
lyzed as a whole instead of dissecting each individual safeguard
incorporated in the rule. 0 4
In conjunction with the USDA's prediction that there was a
very small probability of Americans becoming infected as a re-
sult of importing Canadian cattle, the court examined other
safeguards, such as age limits on the imported cattle (based on
the USDA finding that young cattle were less prone to carrying
the disease) and the "feed ban" in Canada (where cattleman
were prohibited from feeding their cattle the substances known
to cause mad cow disease). 0 5 The court also noted internal
controls, such as cattle slaughtering requirements, implemented
to minimize the risk of contaminating meat.'0 6 Finally, the
court recognized the USDA's finding of the overall low inci-
dence of humans contracting mad cow disease.'0 7
The central problem the FAA attempted to address through
the NPRM is the ongoing threat of terrorism in the country, spe-
cifically in highly conspicuous areas such as the nation's capi-
tal.'0 8 The FAA asserted its belief that terrorists could strike via
general aviation ("GA") aircraft and expressed concern that "the
destructive potential of a small aircraft loaded with explosives
may be significant."'0° The AOPA disagreed with the FAA that
small planes could cause great damage and therefore concluded
that these plans could not pose a security risk." 0 It noted that
"experts have agreed that light aircraft traveling at slow speeds
do not pose a serious national security threat, as illustrated by
the fact that relatively little damage occurred in the January 5,
2002, incident in which a ninth grade student flew into a
Tampa, Florida office tower.""' Further, the AOPA cited the
102 Id.
103 Id.




108 DC SFRA NPRM, supra note 1, at 45,250.
109 Id. at 45,256. GA aircraft are privately owned aircraft, including helicopters
and charter jets, but not including commercial airliners. Boynton interview,
supra note 8.
I H) AOPA Comment, supra note 14, at 9.
IH] Id.
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General Accounting Office as saying "the small size, lack of fuel
capacity, and minimal destructive power of most general avia-
tion aircraft make them unattractive to terrorists and, thereby,
reduce the possibility of threat associated with their misuse."
' 1 2
Despite the AOPA's assertion, the concerns of the FAA are
not unfounded. It is certainly reasonable to conclude that even
a small plane filled with explosives could cause severe damage to
a building or anything else with which it collides. In its Request
to Permanently Codify Temporary Flight Restrictions Over the
Washington, DC, Metropolitan Area, the FAA outlined the con-
cern shared by the DHS of an attack on the United States with a
GA aircraft. First, the government was alerted to a planned at-
tack of the U.S. Consulate in Pakistan with a small aircraft
loaded with explosives."' Second, information came to the at-
tention of the government exposing terrorist crop dusting oper-
ations.1" 4 Third, the United States had reason to believe that
terrorists were planning another suicide hijacking scheme in
June 2003.15 Fourth, debriefings of Khalid Shaykh Muham-
mad, a terrorist detainee, indicated a plan of follow-up terrorist
operations to the September 11 attack in the D.C. area.'"' Fifth,
Muhammad admitted in his testimony to Congress that A]-
Qu'ida originally intended to use GA aircraft on September 11,
before a last minute change to large commercial aircraft.'" The
FAA also expressed concern that a terrorist would not merely
crash into a building, but also would use a GA aircraft to trans-
port and use biological, chemical, radioactive, or conventional
weapons.'8 In addition, it is not beyond all possibility that the
FAA is privy to classified information regarding past or future
terrorist threats that were calculated into their risk assessment.
The FAA's announcement of the problem here is more com-
pelling than the NHTSA in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Associa-
lion in that there, NHTSA was revoking a safety standard based
on automobile manufacturer technology, while here the FAA is
implementing a safety procedure to combat a known threat.
112 Id. at 15 (citing U.S. Gov'T ACcOUNTABILITY OFFICE, INCRFASF 1) FEDERAI
OVERSIGHT Is NEEDED, BUT CONTINUEI) PARTNERSI II' WITlI II H PRIVATE SE(CTOR IS
CRITICAL TO LONG-TER\I SUCCESS, REPORT 1O H. COMM. ON AI'PROPRIATIONS, Sub-
comm. on Homeland Security, GAO-05-144, at 38 (Nov. 2004)).





,1 Id. at 45,258.
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The above factors, while unable to pinpoint an exact measure-
ment of terrorist threat, paint a.picture of justified agency con-
cern over the use of GA aircraft as a vehicle for further terrorist
activity aimed at the United States. While this seems to fit the
classification of "less than ideal clarity," the agency has left the
public and a reviewing court a discernable path. Just as the cir-
cuit court in Ranchers Cattleman deferred to the USDA's calcula-
tion of the prevalence rate of cattle with mad cow disease over
the calculation of the Ranchers Cattleman Legal Fund, a court
would likely defer to the FAA's contention that a GA plane
could present a hazard over the AOPA's contention to the con-
trary, and therefore find that the DC SFRA is not arbitrary and
capricious.
IV. REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY ANALYSIS
As the FAA's analyses are explored, it is important to remem-
ber that no final rule has been proposed. As will be discussed
below, a challenge may not be brought against a proposed rule.
Since the FAA has not promulgated the final DC SFRA, the pro-
posed regulatory flexibility analysis will be analyzed under the
initial requirements.
A. THE PURPOSE AND HISTORY OF THE REGULATORY
FLEXIBILITY ACT
The Regulatory Flexibility Act ("RFA") requires agencies to
consider the impact of a rule on small businesses in the pro-
posed rule phase and in the final rule phase. Under current
procedure, an agency promulgating a rule subject to section 553
of the APA will conduct an initial regulatory flexibility analy-
sis." 9 The initial analysis should include the following:
(1) [A] description of the reasons why action by the agency is
being considered; (2) a succinct statement of the objectives of,
and legal basis for, the proposed rule; (3) a description of and,
where feasible, an estimate of the number of small entities to
which the proposed rule will apply; (4) a description of the pro-
jected reporting, recordkeeping and other compliance require-
ments of the proposed rule, including an estimate of the classes
of small entities which will be subject to the requirement and the
119 Christopher M. Grengs, Making the Unseen Seen: Issues and Options in Small
Business Regulatmy Reform, 85 MINN. L. REv. 1957, 1962-63 (2001). A rule is sub-
ject to section 553 unless it involves a military or foreign affairs function, an inter-
nal agency management or personnel issue, or a "public property, loans, grants,
benefits, or contracts . . ." matter. 5 U.S.C.A. § 553(a) (West 2005).
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type of professional skills necessary for preparation of the report
or record; (5) an identification, to the extent practicable, of all
relevant Federal rules which may duplicate, overlap, or conflict
with the proposed rule.'
2
"
After publishing the initial regulatory flexibility analysis in the
Federal Register, entities are encouraged to comment on the
agency's findings. '2 ' The agency will then conduct a final regu-
latory flexibility analysis, which must include the following:
(1) [A] succinct statement of the need for, and objectives of the
rule; (2) a summary of the significant issues raised by the public
comments in response to the initial regulatory flexibility analysis,
a summary of the assessment of the agency of such issues, and a
statement of any changes made in the proposed rule as a result
of such comments; (3) a description of and an estimate of the
number of small entities to which the rule will apply or an expla-
nation of why no such estimate is available; (4) a description of
the projected reporting, recordkeeping and other compliance
requirements of the rule, including an estimate of the classes of
small entities which will be subject to the requirement and the
type of professional skills necessary for preparation of the report
or record; and (5) a description of the steps the agency has taken
to minimize the significant economic impact on small entities
consistent with the stated objectives of applicable statutes, includ-
ing a statement of the factual, policy, and legal reasons for select-
ing the alternative adopted in the final rule and why each one of
the other significant alternatives to the rule considered by the
agency which affect the impact on small entities was rejected.' -2 2
1. Pre-1996
Signed into law by President Carter, the RFA was passed in an
effort to ensure that agencies would properly recognize the im-
pact of regulations upon small businesses. 2 ' If a proposed regu-
lation would have a significant impact on a substantial number
of small entities, the agency was required to conduct a regula-
tory flexibility analysis. 124 In practice, many agencies did not ad-
here to the RFA, for example, by certifying that small agencies
would not be impacted by the proposed regulation. There was
no judicial review of agency compliance with the RFA under the
120 5 U.S.C. § 603(b).
121 Id. § 603(a); Grengs, sulna note 119, at 1963.
122 5 U.S.C. § 604(a).
l " Richard A. Greene, Recent Developments in Federal Regulatoy Policy, 6 J. SMALL
& ENIRG;ING; Bus. L. 607, 610 (2002).
124 Id.; see also 5 U.S.C. § 605(b).
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original statute." 5 Agency compliance was monitored by Chief
Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration
("SBA"), but the SBA lacked enforcement powers.' 26 The regu-
latory flexibility analysis could, however, become part of the en-
tire record, and upon review a court could determine that if the
analysis was "so flawed that it undercut the rationality of the
rule, then the rule is invalid, not due to of the agency's failure to
comply with the RFA, but because the rule violated the rulemak-
ing standards set out in the APA."'1 27 But without fear of specific
judicial review of the flexibility analysis, agencies complied with
the RFA only minimally, if at all. 128
2. Post-1996
These failures caused Congress to pass the Small Business
Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 ("SBREFA").129
The SBREFA brought new requirements to agencies completing
a regulatory flexibility analysis. Agencies are now required to
state how many small entities will feel the impact of the rule, to
give reasons why such an impact on small entities could not be
minimized, and to describe the skills needed for recordkeeping
compliance with the new rule.3 Under the amendment, an
agency must also provide a factual basis if it concludes that small
entities will not be impacted by the regulation. 3 ' Congress can
now review promulgated rules under the SBREFA. 13 2 The SBA
was also given an ombudsman through which small businesses
may file complaints against an agency's actions.133 By amending
the Equal Access to Justice Act, the SBREFA enabled small enti-
ties to recover costs and attorney's fees if enforcement of the
agency's rule is substantially excessive and unreasonable. 34
125 Barry A. Pineless, The Small Business Regulatoiy Enforcement Fairness Act: New
Options in Regulatory Relief, 5 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 29, 37 (1997).
126 Grengs, supra note 119, at 1962.
127 Pineless, supra note 125, at 37.
128 Id.
129 Greene, supra note 123, at 611.
130 Pineless, supra note 125, at 38.
131 Id.
132 Small Business Regulatory Enforcement and Fairness Act of 1996 Pub. L.
No. 104-121, §§ 251-253, 110 Stat. 847, 868-74 (codified as 5 U.S.C. §§ 801-08);
Grengs, supra note 119, at 1968.
133 15 U.S.C.A. § 657 (West 2005); Grengs, supra note 119, at 1971.
134 Contract With America Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121 §§ 231-232, 110
Stat. 862-63 (1996); Jeffery J. Polich, Judicial Review and the Small Business Regula-
tory Enforcement Fairness Act: An Early Examination of When and Where Judges Are Us-
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Agencies are not required to modify their rules to accommo-
date small entities. Instead, agencies are only required to ac-
knowledge the significant issues brought to light during the
comment period, summarize the agency's assessment of those
issues, and state how the proposed rule was modified as a result
of the public comments.'11
5
3. Judicial Review of a Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
The SBREFA also created a cause of action for small busi-
nesses against the agency for compliance or noncompliance
with the flexibility analysis.' 36 A small entity can now bring a
claim to challenge an agency's compliance with the RFA after a
final rule has been promulgated, generally within one year of
the rule's promulgation.' 7 The court must order a corrective
remedy, such as remanding the rule to the agency and not en-
forcing the rule unless the rule affects special public interests.'1:
Under the judicial review provision, agencies must be careful
to use accurate information in their regulatory flexibility analy-
sis,"' 9 In Northwest Mining Ass'n v. Babit, the Bureau of Land
Management ("BLM") announced that small entities were not
substantially affected when regulatory action would force small
miners to post a bond in order to operate. 4 " The BLM failed to
use the definition of "small entity" as required under the RFA,
which would have required use of the SBA's definition of "small
business" within the meaning of the industry.' 4 ' Because of a
failure to comply with statutory requirements, the court re-
manded the rule and deferred enforcement. '4 2
An agency can also weaken its position by incorrectly using
the information in reaching conclusions under the regulatory
flexibility analysis. 4 ' In Southern Offshore Fishing Ass'n v. Daley,
ing Their Newly Granted Power over Federal Regulatoay Agencies, 41 Wm. & MARY L.
RI-v. 1425, 1441 (2000).
135 5 U.S.C.A. § 604(a)(2) (West 2005); Grengs, supra note 119, at 1963-64.
1Il 5 U.S.C.A. § 611.
137 Id. § 611 (a)( 1), (3) (A).
138 Id. § 611(a) (4).
119 Polich, supra note 134, at 1457 (explaining that judges will likely remand a
regulation to an agency if there is a glaring error in the analysis, such as an im-
proper definition of "small entity").
140 Id. at 1447 (summarizing Nw. Mining Ass'n v. Babit, 5 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C.
1998)).
141 Nw. Mining Ass'n, 5 F. Stipp. 2d at 15; Polich, supra note 134, at. 1448.
142 Nw. Mining Ass'n, 5 F. Stipp. 2d at 16; Polich, supra note 134, at 1448-49.
143 Polich, supra note 134, at 1458.
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the National Marine Fishery Service ("NMFS") certified in both
its initial regulatory flexibility analysis and its final regulatory
flexibility analysis that small businesses would not be signifi-
cantly impacted by harvest quotas and minimum fish size re-
quirements.1 44 The NMFS maintained that fishermen harmed
by the rule could subsidize their income by fishing other types
of fish not subject to the quota. 4 5 The court noted that the
conclusion reached by the NMFS was not reasonable because
the shark fishermen who filed the complaint could not easily
convert their equipment to harvest other types of fish and subsi-
dize their incomes, so the final rule did significantly impact a
substantial number of fishermen. 1
46
4. The AOPA's Argument
The AOPA contended that a defective regulatory flexibility
analysis can weaken the reasoning behind the rule, resulting in
a potential invalidation of the rule.147 The AOPA cited Thomp-
son v. Clark, where a claim was filed against the Secretary of the
Interior, in pertinent part, for failing to comply with section
605(b) of the RFA.' 48 As with Northwest Mining Ass'n and Offshore
Fishing Ass'n, the agency head in Thompson certified that the rule
would not significantly impact "a substantial number of small
entities." '149 The complaint in Thompson alleged insufficient evi-
dence to support the agency head's determination and failure
to comply with the RFA because the agency did not publish its
reasons for concluding the small entities were not impacted.
1 5 1
Contrary to what the AOPA believed the court concluded, the
court comes out on the side of limited judicial review. 15 1
144 S. Offshore Fishing Ass'n v. Daley, 995 F. Supp. 1411, 1424 (M.D. Fla.
1998); Polich, supra note 134, at 1443-44.
145 S. Offshore Fishing Ass'n, 995 F. Supp. at 1434; Polich, supra note 134, at
1444-45.
146 S. Offshore Fishing Ass'n, 995 F. Supp. at 1436; Polich, supra note 134, at
1446.
147 AOPA Comment, supra note 14, at 8 (citing Thompson v. Clark, 741 F.2d
401, 405 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
148 Id.; Thompson, 741 F.2d at 404.
149 Thompson, 741 F.2d at 403; 5 U.S.C.A. § 605(b) (West 2005).
150 Thompson, 741 F.2d at 404.
151 The AOPA Comment reads:
In Thompson, the court evaluated a cost-benefit analysis under the
RFA and concluded: "For example, if a defective regulatory flexibility
analysis caused an agency to underestimate the harm inflicted
upon small business to such a degree that, when adjustment is
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It is important to note that Thompson was decided in 1984,
before the SBREFA was passed. At that time, the RFA specifi-
cally disallowed judicial review of decisions by an agency con-
cerning the "applicability of any provisions of [the RFA] to any
action of the agency," and further prohibited judicial review of
the actual analysis, as well as compliance or noncompliance with
the RFA. 1 2 Since the flexibility analyses could become part of
the record of review if the rule was challenged on other
grounds, the claim alleged a logical dilemma in that while the
rule does not allow for review of the flexibility analysis itself, a
court could review the analysis in conjunction with other materi-
als in the record to determine if the rule should stand. 1 53 The
court disagreed with the petitioner's conclusion that Congress
intended to prohibit interlocutory review but allow for review of
the final rule, and instead interpreted § 611 to allow for review
of the flexibility analysis with the rest of the record to determine
if the rule complies with the enabling statute and other applica-
ble law. 1 4
5. The FAA's Analysis Conducted Under the Regulatory Flexibility
Act
Today's § 611, as discussed above, allows for 'judicial review
of agency compliance with the requirements of sections ... 604
* . ." (the final flexibility analysis). 5 Facing the FAA would be
the question of whether a court would consider compliance to
be purely procedural, by simply ensuring the FAA provided the
information required under § 604 (examined here under § 603
because no final flexibility analysis has been conducted), or
whether a court would conduct a more searching review of the
information provided to determine if it was adequate to enable
the agency to reach its decision.
made for the error, that harm clearly outweighs the claimed bene-
fits of the rule, then the rule must be set aside."
AOPA Comment, supfa note 14, at 8 (quoting Thompson, 741 F.3d at 405) (em-
phasis added). The court actually held, however, that it could not review the
agency head's determination that small entities would not be significantly im-
pacted by the new rule.
152 5 U.S.C. § 611 (a)-(b) (1984), amended by Small Business Regulatory En-
forcement and Fairness Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121, §§ 201-53, 110 Stat. 847,
857-74.
I d. § 611(b); Thompson, 415 F.2d at 405.
154 Thompson, 415 F.2d at 405.
155 5 U.S.C.A. § 611(a) (1) (West 2005).
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As to the first factor required under the initial regulatory flex-
ibility analysis, the FAA considered the DC SFRA in an attempt
to prevent future terrorist attacks such as those that occurred on
September 11, 2001.' 56 In the view of the FAA, terrorists gaining
access to GA aircraft and potentially transporting chemicals or
other hazardous agents poses a significant risk to the capital and
to Americans.' 57 Second, the objective of the DC SFRA is to
"combine all the airspace restrictions within the Washington,
DC Metropolitan Area into one regulation.""15 By consolidating
current regulations, the FAA aimed to strengthen security in the
capital area and aid the DOD and DHS in enforcing security
measures. 159
Third, the FAA's initial flexibility analysis classified the group
of small entities as small GA airports, or those that are "indepen-
dently owned with annual revenues of less than $5 million or
owned by a small governmental jurisdiction with a population
less than 50,000."16 ° The FAA could obtain compliance and cost
information on only the Maryland Three airports, of which only
Potomac Airfield and Washington Executive/Hyde Field met
the definition of "small airports" above. 6' Therefore, the FAA's
analysis was based on only Potomac Airfield and Washington Ex-
ecutive/Hyde Field, two of the three airports covered by the for-
mer DC SFAR 94. 62 While the FAA stated that it could not be
sure that the DC SFRA would have a significant economic im-
pact on a substantial number of small entities because of the
limited information, it conceded that if the two airports for
which it had information were the only two in the DC SFRA,
there would be a significant economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities.16 3 The FAA also admitted that poten-
tially all pilots who use airports in the D.C. area will feel the
impact of the DC SFRA, even if they are based out of airports in
other parts of the country, without regard to the difference be-
tween pilots who fly for work and pilots who fly for pleasure.'64
Because there is a potential significant impact on a substantial




-6 Id. at 45,257.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Id. at 45,258.
164 Id.
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number of small entities, the FAA conducted the entire flexibil-
ity analysis.
Fourth, the FAA undertook a limited compliance cost analysis
and explained its limitations were due to factors such as the lack
of a source with financial information for all airports and a lack
of knowledge as to whether these airports can obtain credit. ' 5
The FAA compared the potential compliance cost of the DC
SFRA with the costs incurred by the small airports of the DC
SFAR 94 and found that, after complying with DC SFAR 94, se-
curity costs to Potomac Airfield were $63,800.00 and costs to
Washington Executive/Hyde Field were $79,500.00."'" The cost
of complying with DC SFAR 94 was $252,900.00 to Potomac Air-
field and $334,000.00 to Washington Executive/Hyde Field, in-
cluding a twenty percent increase for unaccounted Costs.167
Further, the security requirements caused pilots to relocate to
other airports, resulting in lost revenue.' 8 Aircraft use of the
airports generates income through tie-down fees, landing fees,
rent, fuel sales, flight schools, sightseeing income, and aircraft
rentals.'69 As pilots fled the airports, so did their fees and pay-
ments. Airports outside the DC SFRA, but still close to Washing-
ton, D.C., will benefit by acquiring new business, but the airports
within the DC SFRA will still earn income from pilots who must
fly in the restricted area, bringing an estimated $368,500.00 an-
nually for Potomac Airfield and $596,500.00 annually for Wash-
ington Executive/Hyde Field."" The FAA admitted the DC
SFRA would "impact the viability of these affected airports."'' 7'
As to the final factor of the flexibility analysis, the FAA stated
that the DC SFRA will not overlap with any other federal
regulations. 7 2
If a court simply ran down the checklist of requirements given
under the RFA, the FAA's analysis would likely satisfy the in-
quiry, because it provided information for each factor to the
best of its ability. Ranchers Cattleman states that the requirements
of the RFA are purely procedural and that agencies are simply
required to put forth a good faith effort to comply with proce-
15 /(1.
1;i Id.
1I7 Id. at 45,257-58.
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dure.173 It is likely that the FAA would have authority to support
an argument that the requirements of the RFA are procedural
and not substantive, and therefore the FAA's analysis should
withstand judicial review.
In Northwest Mining Ass'n and Offshore Fishing Ass'n, the courts
conducted a more searching analysis, but both cases questioned
certifications by the agencies that small businesses would not be
impacted. If the FAA's flexibility analysis was substantively ex-
amined, the court would likely note that the FAA readily admits
that small businesses will be impacted. The extent of that im-
pact was based on the information from the airports that cur-
rently suffer from the DC ADIZ. The conclusion that small
airports will incur financial losses is based on the best informa-
tion the FAA had at its disposal at the time it issued the NPRM.
Deducing that these airport6 will be impacted and could possi-
bly decide to stop operations is not an unreasonable assessment
from the data used by the FAA. For these reasons, the FAA's
regulatory flexibility analysis would likely satisfy a court's sub-
stantive inquiry.
V. ALTERNATIVES ANALYSIS
A reviewing court also looks for analysis justifying the rule
among other alternatives. So long as the agency considers rele-
vant factors, and "articulate [s] any rational connection between
the facts found and the choices made," the court will defer to
the agency. 74
A. CONSIDERATION OF ALTERNATIVES
United States Air Tour Ass'n v. Federal Aviation Administration il-
lustrates the deferential standard courts use to evaluate an
agency's consideration of alternatives to a rule.'75 In that case,
the FAA promulgated two rules, in addition to those rules previ-
ously promulgated, addressing noise concerns attributed to tour
flights over the Grand Canyon. 176 One of the rules capped the
number of air tours companies could make over the Grand Can-
yon, limiting them to the number of flights conducted in the
173 Ranchers Cattleman Action Legal Fund United Stockgrowers of Am. v. U.S.
Dep't of Agric., 415 F.3d 1078, 1101 (9th Cir. 2005).
174 Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962); Ranchers
Cattleman, 415 F.3d at 1093.
175 See U.S. Air Tour Ass'n v. FAA, 298 F.3d 997 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
176 Id. at 1003.
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year of May 1, 1997 through April 30, 1998.1 v To form this rule,
the FAA worked with the National Park Service to evaluate the
noise made by aircraft in an effort to restore natural quiet to the
Grand Canyon. 78 The Air Tour Association filed suit, claiming
in part that the FAA violated the RFA by "fail[ing] to consider
significant alternatives that would minimize the Rule's eco-
nomic impact on small entities."1 79 The FAA listed alternatives
such as altitude restrictions, the use of flight-free zones, and the
use of quiet aircraft, among others, with brief descriptions of
each suggestion." The court gave this contention little atten-
tion though, and simply stated that the FAA listed nine alterna-
tives and explained why each was inferior to the rule ultimately
chosen. 8 '
B. THE AOPA's PROPOSED ALTERNATIVES
The AOPA asserted that current safeguards in conjunction
with the DC FRZ would reduce the need for some of the DC
SFRA requirements. Specifically, the AOPA pointed to the pilot
and student-pilot screening process, whereby the TSA is author-
ized to direct the FAA to revoke a pilot's certificate if it finds a
security threat. 8 Next, the AOPA described restrictions placed
on flight training, such as background checks for flight trainees
who are not U.S. citizens and security awareness training for
flight school employees.' The TSA is also required to approve
foreign-registered GA aircraft before they are cleared to pene-
trate the NAS. "'84 Aircraft security measures have also been
taken, such as the AOPA's Airport Watch System, where pilots
are trained to recognize and report suspicious activity at GA air-
ports.115 Further security measures have also been geared to-
ward identification of pilots. For example, pilots are required to
carry a government issued form of identification, and pilots' cer-
tificates now include a hologram to reduce the likelihood of
177 Id. at 1004,
178 Id. at 1004-5.
179 Id. at 1011.
180 Commercial Air Tour Limitation in the Grand Canyon Nat'l Park Special
Flight Rules Area, 65 Fed. Reg. 17,708, 17,729-30 (Apr. 4, 2000) (codified as 14
C.F.R. § 93.319 (2005)).
'll U.S. Air Tour Ass'n, 298 F.3d at 1011.
132 AOPA Comment, supra note 14, at 22.
18' Id.
184 Id.
1s15 Id. at 23.
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counterfeiting."8 6 Finally, NORAD has implemented a new red
and green laser warning system to alert pilots who unknowingly
enter the FRZ to make contact with ATC and exit the air-
space. 8 7 The AOPA also noted that numerous security mea-
sures taken within the GA industry already may counteract any
terrorism threats, such as limited access to training, more over-
sight of pilot certificates, and measures to prevent unauthorized
access to airplanes. 18
C. ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED BY THE FAA
The DC SFRA NPRM contains a list of alternatives to the pro-
posed rule. First, The FAA considered simply removing the
flight restrictions in the D.C. area.8 9 But, as the FAA con-
cluded, this would hardly comply with the stated goal of prevent-
ing terrorism in the capital area.190 Second, the FAA thought,
and ultimately decided to codify the existing flight restrictions at
a cost to airports in the area, but with the benefit of aircraft
identification in the capital. 9 ' In its Request to Permanently
Codify Temporary Flight Restrictions Over the Washington, DC
Metropolitan Area, the FAA explains that the dimensions of the
proposed SFRA, consisting of the current DC ADIZ and DC
FRZ, are the "minimum acceptable [dimensions and proce-
dures] to successfully accomplish their missions and should be
retained on a permanent basis."' 9 2 Third, the FAA examined a
plan to combat the terrorism threat by simply shutting down all
airports in the restricted area.'93 In addition to potential Fifth
Amendment takings issues, numerous costs would ensue if this
option were chosen, ranging from lost profit to the current air-
ports, to expenses for the pilots based at these airports to move
to new home airports, to lost business in the area.' Accord-
ingly, the FAA did not endorse this option. Finally, the FAA
considered retaining the inner, highly restricted FRZ while elim-
inating the ADIZ around the capital.' This option would re-
186 Id.
187 Id.
188 Id. at 21.
189 DC SFRA NPRM, supra note 1, at 45,259.
190 Id.
191 Id.
192 Id. at 45,252.
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suit in security regulations that are not adequate to protect the
area, and so the FAA purged the idea.',
The manner in which the FAA undertook the alternative anal-
ysis for the DC SFRA does not differ substantially from the man-
ner in which the FAA analyzed alternatives pertaining to the
noise level of flights around the Grand Canyon. In its final rule
regarding noise in the Grand Canyon area, the FAA briefly de-
scribed each alternative and explained why the final rule was
preferable. The FAA did the same with respect to the DC SFRA.
The AOPA proffers a specific alternative of reducing the proce-
dural requirements for a pilot penetrating the DC SFRA, but the
FAA believes the very procedures it endorsed are essential to the
goal of preventing terrorist attacks.197 A court would likely defer
to the FAA's decision to forego the alternatives in the DC SFRA
NPRM, even in light of the AOPA's suggestions.
VI. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
Finally, the AOPA contended that the FAA is required to con-
sider costs and benefits of the DC SFRA under Executive Order
12,866 ("EO 12,866") and should consider costs and benefits
under the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA). 98
1o Ii.
197 AOPA Comment, supra note 14, at 8; see generally DC SFRA NPRM, supra
note 1.
198 The FAA is not required to undergo a UMRA analysis because the proposed
regulation would not have an effect of $100,000,000.00 annually
($127,000,000.00 annually when accounting for inflation) on the private sector
or government. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, 2 U.S.C.A. § 1532 ( West2005);
AOPA Comment, supra note 14, at 7; DC SFRA NPRM, supra note 1, at 45,259.
The AOPA noted that the analyses required under the UMRA and EO 12,866 are
essentially the same and so proposed that the FAA should examine costs and
benefits, as if conducting an analysis under the UMRA. AOPA Comment, supra
note 14, at 7.
Essentially, the UMRA requires a cost-benefit and future compliance costs anal-
ysis. 2 U.S.C. § 1532. The applicable factors that are required tinder the UMRA
that are not required under EO 12,866 include an assessment of the availability
of federal funding to aid in complying with the regulation, the extent of dispro-
portionate effects of the regulation on a particular portion of the private sector,
and an estimation of the impact of the regulation on the national economy. Id.
§ 1532.
The items included in the UMRA but not in EO 12,866 are not at issue in the
AOPA's comment. There could be any number of reasons why the FAA chose
not to conduct the UMRA analysis, such as limited time and resources, or simply
that costs and benefits were adequately addressed in the EO 12,866 analysis and
the regulatory flexibility analysis.
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A. EXECUTIVE ORDER 12,866
President Clinton issued EO 12,866 in 1993 in an effort to
create a regulatory system that benefits the nation and its people
and is in tune with the nation's economic policies and goals. 199
EO 12,866 is primarily concerned with costs of regulation, bene-
fits to society, and alternatives to the proposed regulation.2 °0
EO 12,866 instructs agencies conducting an analysis to submit
their findings to the Office of Management and Budget
("OMB"), the executive office charged with ensuring regula-
tions are "consistent with applicable law, the President's priori-
ties, and the principles set forth in . . .Executive order
[12,866] .... -201 The Office of Information and Regulatory Af-
fairs ("OIRA"), is housed within the OMB reviews the analyses
conducted under EO 12,866.202 Oversight of agency compli-
ance with EO 12,866 remains with the executive branch, and the
order "does not create any right or benefit, substantive or proce-
dural, enforceable at law or equity by a party against the United
States, its agencies or instrumentalities, its officers or employees,
or any other person. ' 2 3 Many requirements are given in EO
12,866, and so only those of concern to the AOPA are addressed
here.
In deciding whether and how to regulate, agencies should assess
all costs and benefits of available regulatory alternatives, includ-
ing the alternative of not regulating. Costs and benefits shall be
understood to include both quantifiable measures (to the fullest
extent that these can be usefully estimated) and qualitative mea-
sures of costs and benefits that are difficult to quantify but never-
theless essential to consider.20 4
The OMB offers suggestions to conduct an adequate cost-ben-
efit analysis, such as using a reasonable baseline and discounting
dollars to account for inflation, which the FAA incorporates into
their analysis as appropriate. 20 5 But quantifying the benefits is
199 Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, § (1)(a) (Sept. 30, 1993)
[hereinafter EO 12,866].
200 See id. § (1) (A).
201 Id. § 2(b).
202 Id.
203 Id. § 10.
204 Id. § (1)(a).
205 OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, Eco-
NOMIC ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12866,
§ (III) (A) (3) (a) (1996), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/
riaguide.html.
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not feasible because they mostly encompass preventing terrorist
attacks, and many factors (such as what would be attacked, what
property would be destroyed, how many lives would be lost) are
simply unknown.
B. COSTS AND BENEFITS THE AOPA CONTENDS SHOULD BE
INCLUDED IN THE EO 12,866 ANALYSIS
The AOPA correctly noted the FAA's classification of the DC
SFRA as significant regulatory action because it will "adversely
affect in a material way . . .a sector of the economy . . 20
Even though the FAA conducted the cost-benefit analysis for sig-
nificant regulatory action, the AOPA contended that the FAA
did not "adequately analyze [the] costs and benefits" of the DC
SFRA. 2°" First, the AOPA stated that ATC lacks the resources
and ability to complete the amount of work that will follow from
the implementation of the DC SFRA due to increased flight
plans and lack of consistency in applying the current DC ADIZ
requirements to each flight. 21 8 Pilots currently experience
delayed wait times because of a clogged ATC system. 20 9 Pilots
are also often unable to obtain the discrete transponder code
needed to penetrate the DC ADIZ because of limited phone
lines for pilots to call to obtain the code and, even more signifi-
cantly, limited ATC personnel to answer the phones.21 " The
costs are felt by people in all fields, such as medical patients
awaiting blood or organs, and others in need of overnight ship-
ment of goods or documents. 1'
The AOPA also noted that small businesses in the D.C. area
began to recover from the aviation grounding after September
11, but recovery slowed after the implementation of the DC
ADIZ in February 2003.212 The AOPA outsourced Aviation Man-
agement Consulting Group to analyze the projected economic
burden of the DC SFRA, which found, for example, that Lees-
burg Executive Airport suffered a $130,000.00 loss in personal
income from 2002 to 2004 due to lost jobs in their Fixed Base
206 AOPA Comment, supra note 14, at 7; DC SFRA NPRM, supra note 1, at
45,255; EO 12,866, supra note 199, § 3(f)(1).
207 AOPA Comment, supra note 14, at 8.
208 Id. at 9.
209 Id. at 10.
210 Id. at 11.
211 Id. at 13.
212 Id. at 12.
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Operator sector." 3 Airports in the D.C. area experienced a
$28.5 million loss in revenue from 2002 to 2004.214 The govern-
ment is also projected to spend more than $128.7 million over
ten years on the DC SFRA, in conjunction with a loss of tax reve-
nue from businesses in decline from the flight restrictions.2 15
The AOPA found the benefits of the DC SFRA to be over-
stated. In direct contradiction to information cited by the FAA,
the AOPA cited TSA officials as saying there is not a threat of
terrorists using GA aircraft.216 Also in contradiction to the
FAA's concern of a GA aircraft being loaded with explosives or
chemicals, the AOPA found that most GA aircraft are so light
that they are "less desirable for terrorist purposes. ' 217 According
to the AOPA, terrorists could not easily obtain explosives be-
cause of current Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms re-
strictions .2 " Also, other government measures, such as
oversight of those attending flight schools and security of planes
while at airports, have reduced the risk of terrorism via GA air-
craft.2 9 The AOPA challenged the FAA to conduct an analysis
of likely threat scenarios to measure the effect of the DC
SFAR.22° Much like the district court in Ranchers Cattleman, the
AOPA wanted hard numbers. The AOPA further asserted that
"innocent pilots who stray into the [DC] ADIZ accidentally" are
not a security threat and the fact that such straying occurs on a
daily basis indicates is a sign that the current ADIZ does not
work.22'
C. THE DC SFRA EO 12,866 ANALYSiS
To determine the costs associated with the DC SFRA, the FAA
undertook an analysis to establish who will be affected and to
213 Id. at 3.
214 Id. at 1.
215 Id. at 13-14.
216 Id. at 14-15.
217 Id. at 15.
218 Id.
219 Id.
220 Id. at 14.
221 Id. at 18-19. Pilots are responsible for checking NOTAMs and complying
with flight restrictions. It is economic waste to send a military aircraft to intercept
pilots and to hold administrative hearings for pilots who cannot comply with re-
strictions, but the idea behind the current DC ADIZ, the Aircraft Defense Identifi-
cation Zone, is to keep a record of who is flying in the restricted airspace. While
costly, the use of such measures demonstrates the FAA's dedication to identifying
those who penetrate the airspace surrounding Washington, D.C.
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what extent by the DC SFRA. The FAA noted that ATC TRAN-
CON and Leesburg Automated Flight Service Station ("AFSS")
facilities, 150 private airports, the government-owned College
Park Airport and the privately-owned Potomac Airfield and
Washington Executive/Hyde Field, and all pilots who travel in
the DC SFRA, would be affected by the proposed rule. 2 ' First,
to determine the extent to which ATC will be affected, the FAA
considered factors such as compensation, benefits, specially
trained employees, and the cost to the AFSS, and found that the
cost to ATC will be $184.27 million over ten years.2 23 The FAA
calculated the increase in ATC costs based on information from
July 2001, 2002, and 2003.24 The increased costs were found to
be $62.12 million for staffing and an additional $122.15 million
to TRACON air traffic control facility for factors such as in-
creased litigation, pilot deviations, and creating a National Se-
curity Special Operations Unit.225
Next, the FAA considered the financial loss to the Maryland
Three Airports. The annual airspace restriction costs to pilots
(based on ground and in-flight delays and the time to file flight
plans) is projected to be $171,900.00 at College Park Airport,
$368,500.00 at Potomac Airfield, and $596,500.00 at Washing-
ton Executive/Hyde FieldY.2  The annual cost for the Maryland
Three airports to comply with the current DC ADIZ restrictions
(increased by twenty percent for unaccounted revenue) is $1.62
million to College Park, $1.63 million to Potomac Airfield, and
$1.60 million to Washington Executive/Hyde Field.22 7 The cost
for flight service station specialists to process the flight plans at
the Maryland Three airports over ten years is projected to be
$60.64 million.2 Unfortunately the FAA could not report on
the lost revenue that will be incurred by the smaller airports and
heliports in the D.C. metropolitan airports because of a lack of
information about these en tities.229
The FAA recognized that all pilots flying into the DC SFRA
would have to file a flight plan and thus estimated the cost to
pilots at $51.70 million over the next ten years, based on an esti-
222 DC SFRA NPRM, supra note 1, at 45,255.
22'1 Id. at 45,256.
22.4 1d.
"2.,, 1d.
226 Id. at 45,356-57.
.227 Id.
',28 1d. at 45,257.
229 Id.
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mated increase in flight plans from 123,800 in 2004 to 135,000
in 2013, an estimated $48.63 for in-flight delay ($119.41 per
hour), and flight plan processing costs. 230
The benefits of the DC SFRA are, of course, unquantifiable.
In addition to enhanced security around the capital region, the
benefits of the DC SFRA extend to an overall national effort to
combat and prevent terrorism on U.S. soil.23 1 The FAA also
noted that the costs of an event such as September 11 contains
classified information and therefore cannot be published, keep-
ing the benefits partially unknown to the public.232 Identifica-
tion of all parties flying over the nation's capital as will be
required under the DC SFRA will enhance the government's
chance of preventing another terrorist act. 233 Furthermore, the
FAA explained that requiring aircraft to be in contact with ATC
reduces the need to send military aircraft to intercept wander-
ing pilots. 2 34 The FAA expects this benefit to increase with time
as pilots come to understand the DC SFRA.235
As noted above, the EO 12,866 analysis is not subject to judi-
cial review. The purpose of the analysis is internal control. The
OMB is the recipient of the EO 12,866 analysis, and its contents
cannot render the DC SFRA invalid.
VII. CONCLUSION
Immediately following a tragedy like September 11, the FAA
likely could have garnered adequate support for the DC SFRA.
But as time passed, people came to fear another aircraft terrorist
attack less and less. In some ways, this complacency demon-
strates that the government is doing its job. While controversy
will always exist over how to best prevent another September 11
attack, the fact that passengers and GA pilots choose to fly dem-
onstrates that Americans are regaining confidence in aviation.
The FAA acted in accordance with its statutory responsibilities
to ensure security in the NAS through the DC SFRA. Questions
such as "Will terrorists strike again using GA aircraft, or any air-
craft for that matter?"; "Do other large metropolitan areas in the
country warrant protection?"; and "Am I willing to sacrifice busi-
230 Id. at 45,256-57.
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ness interests in the name of preventing terrorism?" cannot be
answered in a proposed rule, a final rule, or a challenge to a
final rule. No one knows if and when terrorism will haunt the
United States again, and no one knows the best means of pre-
vention. The FAA has responded to its statutory mandate to the
best of its ability under the limitations of fighting an unknown
enemy.
The DC SFRA, remembering it is not a final rule, has been
shown to withstand the "arbitrary and capricious" standard
under the APA because the FAA has acted in accord with Con-
gress's intent and because the FAA's decision is a logical conclu-
sion from the facts before it. In regard to the regulatory
flexibility analysis, while the AOPA pointed to many systematic
factors that would enhance the FAA's analysis, the case law dem-
onstrates that courts defer to agencies' decisions. The FAA con-
ducted its analysis based on the information available in the
manner it saw best to administer its statutory obligations. Fur-
thermore, the FAA complied with the procedural requirements
of the RFA and could likely withstand any procedural or sub-
stantive scrutiny by a court. Because the FAA considered alter-
natives and found their effect to be inferior to the DC SFRA, the
FAA would also likely withstand judicial review of the alterna-
tives analysis. Finally, the cost-benefit analysis under EO 12,866
is not subject to judicial review. The FAA has therefore com-
plied with the applicable legal standards, and DC SFRA can
likely be implemented.
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